China as a Twenty-First Century Naval Power
Theory, Practice, and Implications, by Michael A. McDevitt
If you're looking for an in-depth and methodical look under the hood into China’s drive to become ‘a great maritime power,’ then this is your book: China as a Twenty-First-Century Naval Power: Theory, Practice, and Implications (2020) by Michael A. McDevitt, Rear Admiral, USN (Ret). McDevitt provides a first-class, comprehensive examination of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) from the “why” of China’s maritime ambition and its integral linkage to China’s geostrategic vision—securing trade and a national interest-dependent economy—through to the ‘how’ of building the objective maritime capability.
The book is straightforward, study-like, and compelling. While it may lack in storytelling entertainment value, it more than makes up for it by providing the reader with an engaging and balanced examination of the PLAN in its leading role in achieving PRC President Xi Jinping’s goal for China’s armed forces to “become a world-class armed force by 2050.”
In 2018, Xi announced stepping up efforts to ensure that “by 2035, the modernization of our national defenses and our force is basically completed; and that by the mid-21st century, our people’s armed forces have been fully transformed into world-class forces.” By the book’s release in 2020, China had already become the second most capable navy in the world in terms of ships and combat systems.
In the years since the book’s release, the priority of the PLA’s growth has intensified. In 2021, the West became aware of President Xi’s goal during a recent Chinese Communist Party meeting of the addition of a new short-term milestone to its existing slate of military modernization calling to “ensure the achievement of the 2027 centennial military building goal.” This 2027 goal would coincide with the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PLA and has been interpreted as a call to be ready to invade Taiwan, although not necessarily reflecting a decision by Beijing to do so.
The former Indo-Pacific Commander, Adm John Aquilino, testified to Congress earlier this year that he believes the PLA will be prepared to invade Taiwan by 2027 and that “all indications point to” the PLA meeting Xi Jinping’s alleged goal. One has to seriously recognize the 2027 goal in our national security calculations and actions. With the increased frequency of naval and air activities around and inside Taiwan’s ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone) in recent years, including this week, the PLAN continues to demonstrate its increasing readiness and maritime capabilities, bringing to the fore the strategy and direction of the PLAN’s rise that McDevitt examines in his book.
Reading the book, I was immediately struck by McDevitt’s depth of knowledge and contextual awareness in illustrating the origins and high priority the PRC places on achieving a “world-class” maritime capability. This isn’t a book that focuses on PLAN ships alone, but surveys all the characteristics necessary to generate naval power—from the PLAN’s mission, tasks, strategy, organization, leadership, command and control, training, support, shipbuilding, key maritime issues, and, of course, ships.
This is McDevitt’s third book on the PLA, and it is clear he is a well-versed expert. It is no wonder that this book is on the Chief of Naval Operations’ professional reading list. During his 34-year naval career, McDevitt commanded an aircraft carrier battlegroup and spent all his operational time in the Indo-Pacific region. Following retirement, he continued his Pacific maritime focus while working with the Center for Naval Analysis.
The book starts with a thorough discussion of China’s maritime power ambitions and PLAN activities in the late 20th century and moves to illustrate how China began the transition from a largely coastal-centric navy to a blue-water, oceanic navy. Not unexpectedly, the book first looks at the big picture strategic setting and mission before drilling down into the PLAN components of maritime power. Subsequent chapters explore a wide array of topics, from China’s methodical learning process in ship development (“build a little, test a little”) and weaponry to the PLAN's role in protecting China’s near waters and global interests along sea lines of communication. McDevitt also examines numerous island disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea, as well as the issue of Taiwan.
The book moves into well-known naval power topics such as ‘offshore waters’ island chain defense strategies, anti-access and area denial capabilities, the emergence of PLAN aircraft carriers, the development of 5th generation fighters, and the critical topic of submarines—both attack and ballistic missile types, conventional and nuclear-powered. While the U.S. currently has an edge in submarines, McDevitt shows how Beijing is working to close the gap, recognizing the critical importance of subsurface warfare.
In my view, the book’s coverage of expected naval power topics is excellent, but McDevitt’s detailed examination of PLAN participation in NATO-sponsored anti-piracy operations, China’s interests in the Indian Ocean, and the role of China’s Coast Guard and Maritime Militia is particularly revealing. These chapters provide significant insight into how Beijing integrates these forces into its broader maritime strategy.
In 2009, China joined NATO’s anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, deploying a three-ship squadron to multinational patrols. Over the years and through continuous deployments, the PLAN’s officers and crews have gained invaluable experience essential for building a credible blue-water fleet.
China’s interests in the Indian Ocean are closely tied to critical sea lines of communication and the Belt and Road Initiative. McDevitt illustrates how the PLAN’s increased presence in the Indian Ocean, in terms of ship deployments and expanding logistical support for power projection, will continue. However, McDevitt talks about the challenges China faces in its tasks while facing formidable opposition from the combined strength of U.S., Indian, and Australian naval forces.
McDevitt includes two appendices on China’s Coast Guard and Maritime Militia. Initially, I expected these to offer a greater level of detail on topics already addressed in the preceding chapters, and the information would be of interest only to the most ardent few. Well, this was not the case. Although the author discusses the Coast Guard and Maritime Militia forces in the main chapters, he provides an exceptional and engaging illustration of the essential role of these below-level-of-conflict forces in protecting China’s maritime rights and interests abroad. In my view, these appendices are a must-read and critical to understanding Beijing’s approach to maritime power.
They are not fluff but are rich in detail, illustrating how Beijing evolved and integrated these traditionally viewed “below the level of military conflict” units assigned to law enforcement roles as the front-line leading-edge instruments of Beijing’s foreign policy leverage. McDevitt does a particularly thorough job in painting the picture of how maritime forces conduct ISR and early warning functions that are well integrated into their command-and-control networks and are significant components of their anti-access, area denial approach, as well as defending their many rights and interests’ protection activities among the many island disputes.
Although Beijing has publicly stated its strategic goal to achieve ‘world-class forces,’ it has not defined the future size or ship mix of the PLAN. McDevitt steps in to fill this gap with his assessment of the PLAN’s objective force size and ship mix. Time will tell if his analysis is correct, but I wouldn’t bet against him.
This book offers balanced insight from a well-experienced expert into the PLAN’s steady expansion, capabilities, and challenges. It goes beyond hyperbolic news headlines to provide a sober and resolute picture of China’s long-term objective of building a world-class navy.
So, if you are looking to get beyond the flashy news headlines and take a professional dive into the PLAN and China’s ascending maritime power, then China as a Twenty-First Century Naval Power is a must-read for you. It is a cogent book, and no wonder it is on the CNO’s professional reading list.
Tags: Book Reviews
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