Korea: War Without End
A Fresh Perspective on the “Forgotten War” Origins, Strategic failures, Impact and Lessons for Today from Two of Britain’s most Experienced Military Voices
The Military Reading Room is thrilled to welcome back to the Visiting Authors’ Corner Dr. Robert Lyman and Lord Richard Dannatt to showcase their newly released book, Korea: War Without End. Drawing on their extensive military service, the authors take a fresh look at the war’s root cause in characterizing the conflict’s true complexities, challenge conventional historical narratives, and question the political-military coherence of war strategies. They provide keen insight to the “Forgotten War,” which is far from forgotten in North Korea and China, but in the West, the war is not so much forgotten as it is fundamentally misunderstood—and was, in part, unnecessary. We are grateful to the authors for taking the time to provide additional insights in this post to their book Korea: War Without End, which was released on May 20, 2025.
What inspired you both to write Korea: War Without End, and why does the subject hold significance for you—personally or professionally?
Richard and I were keen to reevaluate a largely forgotten war, to understand its relevance both to the history of warfare and to the modern global security situation. The war had been presented to us during our military service as an exemplar of limited conflict, in which both sides of the Cold War deliberately limited the fighting so that it never exceeded the threshold of nuclear action. We were not satisfied with this explanation, however. It struck us that very significant influences in the USA were attempting during the war to de-limit the conflict, escalating it to nuclear action. That it in fact did remain limited appeared to us to be the product of accident, and in spite of several attempts to escalate, rather than by deliberate policy to do the opposite.
We also determined that we didn’t want to write a traditional military history, but instead to attempt to understand why the war started, why it developed as it did, and how it ended. We actually started by asking Koreans about what they thought of the war. The results were fascinating, as they demonstrated that in China and South Korea, the war and its implications are a daily lived reality. Our book ended up questioning a range of assumptions about the war and came up with some firm conclusions about what worked and what didn’t.
Likewise, we have been very taken up with trying to understand Ukraine, and it struck us that Korea might offer us some explanation for this war, and perhaps some pointers as to how it might end.
What unique or underused sources did you draw on in your research? Did any of them offer new insights or challenge widely held views of the war?
We discovered very quickly that the Korean War is very contested in the historiography of war, largely driven by the politics of left and right. The left generally blames the USA for both its intervention in 1950 and its subsequent conduct of the war. How fair is this criticism? We concluded that the USA/UN was absolutely right to oppose the egregious military aggrandisement by the North in June 1950 (despite some of the democratic weaknesses of the ROK regime), but that aspects of the subsequent conduct of the campaign were reprehensible, such as the unregulated area bombing of North Korea. We are also critical of the USA’s offensive into North Korea in October 1950, but in this case, not for moral reasons, but because of the absence of any strategic intelligence in the formulation of the offensive. No one seemed to have determined after Inchon what constituted victory in Korea, and instead, the USA seemed to sleepwalk into a foolhardy rush to the Yalu in an attempt to utterly destroy the North and unite the peninsula under the ROK. No one considered whether this was a strategy too far, or what the unintended consequences (such as Chinese intervention) might be. We decided that the key task for all politicians entering war is to debate their national strategy robustly before military action is undertaken, and demonstrate that it is sensible and achievable, and that a route to exit is determined in advance. How often in war is this simple requirement ignored?
What do you think accounts for the Korean War’s status as “the forgotten war,” and why does that historical amnesia matter? What key insights do you hope modern policymakers, military leaders, and readers will take away today?
The Korean War is not forgotten in China, North and South Korea. In China and the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), it’s regarded as the war against US imperialism, supporting a fascist regime in Seoul still in hoc to the old Japanese imperial masters. It’s forgotten in the West, however, primarily because it was overshadowed by Vietnam. We shouldn’t forget it, though. The war dragged the USA back into direct engagement with global security following the end of the Second World War and confirmed the assumptions that had led to the creation of NATO in 1949, namely the danger posed to the world by Stalin’s USSR.
The key conclusions for us with respect to the modern world were the importance of collective security between states. The USA supported the ROK in June 1950 in major part because it had signed a collective defence agreement with the ROK and was therefore obligated to come to the defence of its friend. In 2022, the only country Ukraine had a treaty with was the USSR. The collective arrangements of NATO have, we believe, clearly helped the West prevent similar aggrandisement from its enemies over many decades.
We were also struck by General Matthew B Ridgway’s (Commander Far East Command, and Commander UN Forces) ability to use battle in early 1951 to defeat successive Chinese offensives without resorting to the panicked calls for escalation by his predecessor, MacArthur. MacArthur lost faith in his army to defeat the Chinese, but Ridgway demonstrated that escalation was unnecessary. What was required to end the war? A long attritional campaign between July 1951 and July 1953 along the rough line of the 38th Parallel, in which artillery predominated and which mirrored the experience of 1915-17, was conducted to prove to the Chinese that they could not prevail in their attempts to unite Korea under communism.
You write about the human cost of the war. Why has the suffering of the Korean people been so overlooked in the broader narrative of 20th-century conflicts?
We aren’t sure. The loss of life is objectively shocking. Perhaps it was simply that the loss of so many North Korean civilian lives just did not register on the moral consciousness of US military planners at the time, content to lift and shift the March-August 1945 aerial bombing strategy that had removed such large chunks of Japan’s cities only a few years before.
From the North Korean invasion to China’s entry into the war, what do you see as the most critical moments or miscalculations that shaped the military course of the conflict?
There were two very serious miscalculations, both caused by hubris. First, Kim il Sung miscalculated the results of his invasion. He simply had not considered why the USA (and the UN) would feel it necessary to respond as it did. Then, second, the USA seriously underestimated the Chinese reaction when it invaded North Korea in October 1950.
The Western response was marked by initial unpreparedness, followed by bold but controversial moves like the landing at Inchon and the advance to the Yalu. What lessons do these key military successes or failures offer in terms of strategy, risk, and escalation?
First, prepare for war! The USA was remarkably naked in the face of the need for a rapid military response in 1950, as was, of course, the ROK. Second, establish your campaign objectives and stick to them. This was, in fact, where MacArthur was quite brilliant in 1950 with his counter-offensive at Inchon. Third, agree to your war aims and strategy before you embark on a rush to the Yalu! This was a disaster of enormous proportions, both politically and militarily. Fourth, join a collective security club as quickly as you can to avoid invasion in the first place.
How should we view the Korean War in the broader context of the Cold War? And how should we understand its legacy today—both geopolitically and in terms of the military lessons it may offer?
The Korean War was clearly a war that took place at the outset of the Cold War, but it’s wrong to label it simply a ‘Cold War conflict’. It was as much a civil war as it was an international one. In terms of lessons, the war demonstrated how much a battle could achieve strategic objectives; how easy it is to succumb to the siren voices of escalation; how easy it is to give in to hubris and to fail to apply intellectual rigor to the construction of strategy. Korea is an important lesson in how to avoid war in the first place (preparedness and collective defence), how to conduct it under the threshold of nuclear war (sack MacArthur quickly) and how to bring a war to a close (prove to one’s adversary that they cannot achieve their strategic aims by continuing to fight). All of these lessons have pertinence to Ukraine, if only our political leaders paid Korea any attention.
Authors:
Dr. Robert Lyman is a distinguished British military historian and former British Army officer. He has written extensively on the Second World War, particularly in the Asia-Pacific theater. A Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, Lyman is known for his authoritative narratives. Dr. Lyman’s work can be found on Substack https://substack.com/@drrobertlyman and his Newsletter, The War Room, where he regularly shares commentary on historical and current military matters. You can also find more on his books and other projects at https://robertlyman.com
Lord Richard Dannatt is a retired General, Chief of the General Staff of the British Army, and a member of the House of Lords. With decades of service, including leadership roles in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, and Iraq, Dannatt is a respected voice in defense and strategic affairs.
Together in 2020, they co-authored Victory to Defeat: The British Army 1918-1940
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Tags: Visiting Authors, Cold War, Korean War, Defense Strategy.
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This post is very insightful and informative for us who are interested in learning more about geopolitics and especially historical politics and military conflicts.
I have often thought that the United States should have continued to have an active Military Force after WWIi, much like the Israeli Army has had in its country. Every person serves some time in its safety concerns. I asked my father, who served in the Army in WWIi what he thought of the Idea? He told me the "American People get tired of war." I'd like to know what you Administers, think of this idea? Or is the United States. Sufficiently served with our current Volunteer Service Army?