In addition to John Keegan's treatment, a useful addition would be Invasion-They're Coming, The German Account of the Allied Landings and the 80 Days Battle for France, by Paul Carell (translated from the German by E. Osers).
I really appreciate the effort and depth here and am saving this for future reference. From a C4ISR and Indo-Pacific analysis perspective, the lessons are stark. Operation BODYGUARD was a masterclass in information warfare, and Eisenhower’s unified command highlights the immense C2 challenge of integrating a combined force against a defended shore. Breaching the Atlantic Wall was the A2/AD problem of its day, and these enduring strategic lessons on deception and command are more relevant than ever for any potential contingency in the Pacific today. https://ordersandobservations.substack.com/
With proper planning, knowing the enemy and the paranoia the tyrant had over his military and his refusal to let his best and brightest generals do their jobs, and the willingness to do what is necessary, D-Day succeeded and eventually after the Bocage and the Bulge, let to final victory.
Glad Ike’s letter to the troops became history, instead of this alternative that he wrote down if the landings failed:
“Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based upon the best information available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone.”
Excellent analysis. I always thought what a deal the British got with the command structure. All the component commanders on Day One- Land, Sea & Air were British, but if the landings failed, Ike the Yank bore the responsibility…
In addition to John Keegan's treatment, a useful addition would be Invasion-They're Coming, The German Account of the Allied Landings and the 80 Days Battle for France, by Paul Carell (translated from the German by E. Osers).
I really appreciate the effort and depth here and am saving this for future reference. From a C4ISR and Indo-Pacific analysis perspective, the lessons are stark. Operation BODYGUARD was a masterclass in information warfare, and Eisenhower’s unified command highlights the immense C2 challenge of integrating a combined force against a defended shore. Breaching the Atlantic Wall was the A2/AD problem of its day, and these enduring strategic lessons on deception and command are more relevant than ever for any potential contingency in the Pacific today. https://ordersandobservations.substack.com/
With proper planning, knowing the enemy and the paranoia the tyrant had over his military and his refusal to let his best and brightest generals do their jobs, and the willingness to do what is necessary, D-Day succeeded and eventually after the Bocage and the Bulge, let to final victory.
Glad Ike’s letter to the troops became history, instead of this alternative that he wrote down if the landings failed:
“Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based upon the best information available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone.”
Excellent analysis. I always thought what a deal the British got with the command structure. All the component commanders on Day One- Land, Sea & Air were British, but if the landings failed, Ike the Yank bore the responsibility…